Must-Read: Deputy Commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps on Ukraine’s Theory of Victory, Russian Tactics, and the Technological Transformation of War
Maksym Zhorin, Deputy Commander of one of Ukraine’s most formidable formations—the 3rd Army Corps—and a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, offers a comprehensive assessment of how warfare has evolved over the past four years. He outlines the most pressing challenges facing Ukraine’s military, examines Russia’s tactics, objectives, and incremental battlefield gains, and reflects on Ukraine’s strategy for repelling Russian forces and its broader theory of victory.
CONTENT
Transformation of War
Russian Tactics
Russian Manpower and Mobilization
Ukrainian Strategy and Theory of Victory
Russian Objectives and Successes
Addressing Ukrainian Challenges
Problems with Mobilization and AWOLs
Transformation of War
On Ukraine’s side, the defining development has been the scaling of unmanned robotic systems (URS).
This has led to a significant reduction in losses. In units integrated into this model, casualties have in some cases dropped threefold within the first two months following the implementation of initial management decisions. At the same time, URS have not reached their ceiling; rather, they remain at a very early stage of development.
While soldiers are unlikely to be fully removed from the battlefield, the trajectory is clear: the human role is increasingly shifting toward that of an operator, positioned with appropriate cover, while the primary defensive line is held by robotic systems. These include platforms equipped with small arms, kamikaze capabilities, engineering functions, grenade launchers, and more. The Third Assault Brigade has already demonstrated this in practice, with URS holding positions for a period of time. These systems still require maintenance, rotation, and constant monitoring, but they significantly increase the distance between personnel and direct risk.
This reduces immediate risk to the soldier and, in turn, alleviates the broader mobilization burden—an issue that remains particularly sensitive for society.
On the Russian side, a key development around six months ago was the widespread use of small-group assaults—typically two to three soldiers attacking Ukrainian positions, but executed at scale. In parallel, Russian forces adopted infiltration tactics: rather than engaging directly with frontline defenses, they would bypass contact, push deep into the rear, establish footholds, and wait for reinforcements, thereby disrupting the integrity of the forward defensive system.
Initially, these tactics proved effective, creating serious challenges and, in some sectors, approaching critical conditions. However, they have since reached their limits and no longer produce results comparable to those seen six months earlier.
